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Abstract
This paper presents a model on the leverage of nancial intermediaries, where debt
are held by risk averse agents and equity by the risk neutral. The paper shows that in
an unregulated competitive market, nancial intermediaries choose to be leveraged over
the social best level. This is because the leverage of one intermediary imposes a negative
externality upon others by reducing their prot margins. The paper thus founds capital
adequacy regulation upon the market failure and suggests that this regulation should bind
not only commercial banks, but all nancial intermediaries, including private equities and
hedge funds.
Key words: Risk Di¤erence in Risk Preference Leverage Regulation Externality
JEL: G00, G01, D52, D62
University of Essex. Correspondence: Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colch-
ester, CO4 3SQ, Essex, UK. Email: wangt@essex.ac.uk. I am indebted to John Moore and Motty Perry for their
enormous help and encouragement. I also thank Sanjay Banerji, Xuewen Liu, Francesco Squintani for their
helpful comments.
1
I. Introduction
Leverage is an important ingredient of nancial alchemy to boost the return of capital. For
example, consider a project that requires investment of $100 and returns $101. If a private
equity fund outlays the entire $100 out of its own pocket, it earns a poor return rate of 1%;
if it invests only $1 of its own fund and borrows $99 from a bank, then at the return date, it
repays $99 to the bank and earns $2, with a return rate of 100%. Indeed, "(T)he reliance of
private equity rms on high levels of debt to generate prots has been starkly revealed by an
industry study... The aggregate investment return of the 14 biggest deals realized in 2005-7
was 3.3 times, or 330 percent of the return achieved by FTSE ALL Share in the same industry
sector and timeframes. Of this 330 percent return, ....167 came from the use of extra debt over
the amount at comparable companies at the same sector..."1 Moreover, the problem of banks
being overleveraged is at the core of current crisis.2 All these raise the question: are nancial
intermediaries (FIs) naturally prone to being overleveraged? More fundamentally, how do FIs
decide their leverage levels?
This paper presents a model on the leverage of FIs. Built on the model, it shows that the
leverage of FIs is in itself subject to market failure; thus being overleveraged is a natural feature
of nancial intermediation. The paper, therefore, suggests to regulate indebtedness of the whole
nancial sector where leverage is pervasively used to boost performance.3
The building block model of this paper is based on di¤erence in risk preference, illustrated
as follows. There are many deep pockets and a lot more households. Deep pockets are risk
neutral and each has $4. The households are risk averse and each has $1. Fund is invested either
in one-to-one storage or in a venture with the gross return rate of 0.8 or 1.4, each with a half
chance. Suppose a household cannot split his dollar between the two types of investment and is
deterred by the risk of the venture. He thus chooses to store his dollar. A deep pocket, being risk
1The study is carried out by British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association and Ernest & Young; see
"Buy-out Prots Tied to Debt", Financial Times, January 15, 2009.
2See Brunnermeier(2009) and many essays published in the media by practitioners and policy makers.
3This echos the point of view of Sir Andrew Large, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England, in
"Central Banks Must Be the Debt Watchdogs", Financial Times, January 6, 2009.
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neutral, will invest all his funds in the venture and will earn in expectation $4 0:8+1:4
2
= $4:4.
However, he earns more by borrowing from households and becoming a FI. Suppose he borrows
$1 from a household and invests the entire $5, one borrowed dollar plus his own $4, in a venture.
The investment returns $5  0:8 = $4 in the bad state and $5  1:4 = $7 in the good state.
The household is satised with getting back $1 in each state. The deep pocket thus earns, with
this minor leverage, 0:5  $(4   1) + 0:5  $(7   1) = $4:5; which is $0:1 more than without
any leverage. This extra $0.1 is simply the di¤erence between $1.1, the earning of the borrowed
dollar from the venture, and $1, the repayment to the lender, whom it satises since it is risk
free. Therefore, the deep pocket keeps earning a margin of $0.1 from each borrowed dollar, so
long as his borrowing bears no risk, which requires two conditions. One, he gives priority to the
lendersclaims in the bad state, so his own funds compose the equity of the FI and act as the
cushion to absorb the loss to the lenders in the bad state. The other, the amount borrowed is
not over $16: at this level, the bad state earning, $(4+16)0:8 = $16; exactly su¢ ces to service
the risk free debt. It turns out, however, that he will borrow more and the debt will be risky.
The optimal leverage is decided by the trade-o¤ between the scale and the margin. Given the
margin, the more he borrows, the more he gains; however, the more the borrowing, the further
below 1 the bad state return rate to the lenders, hence as compensation, the higher the good
state rate to them, and the smaller the prot margin. This model captures two realistic points:
leverage serves to boost the return of the capital, and the capital serves to cushion the risk to
debt holders.
The building block model illustrated above, where the ventures return rates are exogenously
given, provides no scope for regulation. However, market failure arises if the return rates are
endogenized, as follows. There are many perfectly correlated ventures, each run by a risk neutral
entrepreneur, with decreasing return to investment scale. The equilibrium return rates of ven-
tures clear the credit market between entrepreneurs and FIs. An individual FI, when deciding its
leverage, takes these rates as given, but the rates decrease with aggregate credit supply. Then,
the leverage of one FI imposes a negative externality upon others: its leverage expands the credit
supply, which marginally lowers the credit return rate in the bad state, which in turn lowers the
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bad state return rate that other FIs o¤er to their lenders; consequently, they have to o¤er a
higher good state return rate, and obtain a smaller prot margin. Because of this externality,
the equilibrium leverage is over the social best level.4
The regulation that prohibits FIs from being leveraged over the social best level will restore
the social best allocation in the market. This regulation shrinks credit supply, raises credit
return rates, and increases the prot of the nancial sector. However, individual FIs, facing the
raised return rates, want to be leveraged over the regulation limit. They would like to set up o¤
balance vehicles, if they can.
The market failure happens only when deep pockets are FIs. If entrepreneurs could issue
papers to both deep pockets and households, they would issue equity to risk averse deep pockets
and debt to risk neutral households, and would be leveraged at the social best level in equilib-
rium.5 In this paper, deep pockets have to do nancial intermediation because of the following
friction. Households cannot, but deep pockets can, distinguish a genuine entrepreneur from
a layman, who only wants to play with others funds. Households only recognize deep pock-
ets. Therefore, they accept only papers issued by deep pockets, but not papers issued by some
self-claimed entrepreneurs.
Relation with the Literature
The capital adequacy requirement plays a key part in Macro and Micro prudential regulation
of banking. The paper discovers the market failure in the leverage of FIs for the rst time, and
founds capital adequacy regulation upon it. Moreover, the paper suggests that such regulation
should be imposed upon, not only commercial banks, but the whole nancial sector. The most
received reasoning for the regulation is based on the governments provision of insurance for
demand deposit: because of the insurance, debt is cheap to banks, which are then inclined to be
4By a similar externality, competition reduces the total prot of the suppliers of a good, but increases con-
sumerssurplus. The trick here, however, is that the externality presents itself even when the utility of households
is xed at the given level.
5Merton Miller (1991) noted in his Nobel Prize lecture, "(C)apital markets have built in controls against
overleveraging...." (page 481). This paper then suggests that the assertion is only half true, true of the leverage
of real sectors, not of the nancial sector.
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overleveraged to exploit the insurance and should thus be subject to capital adequacy regulation.
The insurance for deposit is justied by Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and also
Gorton and Pinnachhi (1990).6 Notice that by this line of reasoning, only commercial banks,
namely those FIs that take demand deposits, should be so regulated. Alternatively, Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994) address banking regulation from the perspective that the regulator represents
small depositors.7 And Morrison and White (2005) consider banking regulation based on the
assumption that the regulator has capacities that private agents do not have. Most papers on
capital adequacy regulation take it as given and consider its e¤ects. Among those papers, Gorton
and Winton (2000), which considers other di¤erences between social and private costs of bank
capital also, uses a general equilibrium framework, while others use partial equilibrium, such
as Merton (1977), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), Furlong and Keeley (1989),
Gennotte and Pyle (1991), Rochet (1992), and Besanko (1996). See Bhattacharya et al. (1998),
Gorton and Winton (2002), and Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a general reference on banking
and its regulation.
The review of the following literature concerns the building block model of this paper on the
leverage of a FI. This literature, however, presents no market failures, thus no role for regulation.
The building block model of this paper deviates from Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM)
by introducing a di¤erence in risk preference on the asset demand side.8 In contrast, the liter-
ature following MM on capital structure, as is surveyed and summarized by Harris and Raviv
(1991) and Myers (2001), deviates by introducing either tax benets of debt (trade-o¤ theory)
or asymmetric information, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), and Myers and
6However, this literature does not provide argument for why the insurance should be provided by the govern-
ment rather than the market, and there is no research that strictly compares these two ways.
7By their argument, it is clear that the representation is necessary. But it is not clear that this representation
service cannot be provided by some private institute, for example, "the assembly of the depositors", over which
the depositors presumably have more and directer control than over the government.
8If there is such a di¤erence, as Myers (2001) has noticed, the irrelevance proposition of MM may not hold.
For example, suppose a rm yields $80 or $120, each with probability one half. Suppose only a part of investors
are risk neutral, who a¤ord exactly $20. Then, the rm can be sold for $100, only by issuing $80 risk free debts
to risk averse investors, and $20 equities to those who are risk neutral.
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Majluf (1984).
The building block model of this paper relates the asset size of a FI to the leverage rate,
similar to Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) (FG) and Adrian and Shin (2008) (AS).9 And in the
three papers, the equilibrium leverage rate decreases with the risk. Leverage serves to boost the
return of the FIs equity in both this paper and AS, while it is driven by the di¤erence in the
belief as to the future in FG (the pessimist lend to the optimist). The optimal leverage is decided
by the trade-o¤ between the scale and the prot margin in this paper, while in AS, it is decided
by incentive compatibility in the risk shifting problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976), namely
that the bank, if overleveraged, will choose the riskier but lower NPV project for the interest of
the equity holders, because they reap the benet when the projects upper side is realized while
the debt holders undertake the loss of the down side.
In the building block model, the capital of a FI works to cushion the risk to debt holders, who
are thus willing to invest in the FI. In contrast, in Diamond and Rajan (2000), the bank capital
helps prevent bank runs, but gives rent to the banker. And while bank capital is also used to
reduce the risk to debt holders in Gorton and Pinnacchi (1990), that is not for risk sharing, as
is in this paper, but for creating risk free saving instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III
considers competitive equilibrium, where the building block model is embedded when the credit
supply is analyzed. Section IV gures out the social best allocation and the regulation that
restores this allocation in the competitive market. Section V concludes. All technical proofs are
relegated to Appendices.
II. The Model
There are two dates, today for contracting and investment and tomorrow for return and dis-
tribution. There is a continuum of N units of households, 1 unit of deep pockets, and 1 unit
of entrepreneurs. Households are risk averse, with the Bernoulli utility function U satisfying
9By MM, the asset side and the liability side can be considered separately. The literature on capital structure
takes the asset side as given and focuses on the liability side.
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U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0: Each household has a small amount of extra capital to invest, normalized to 1
unit. Deep pockets are risk neutral, each having K units of capital.10 Entrepreneurs are risk
neutral and penniless. Each of them runs a venture. Capital is invested either in one-to-one
storage or in a venture. Anyone can access storage, whereas only the entrepreneurs know how
to run ventures. If capital I is invested in a venture, it returns Y = eAh1 I; where h is the
amount of the human capital of the entrepreneur and eA is the macroeconomic shock and the
same for all ventures. Without loss of generality, suppose h = 1: eA is resolved tomorrow; today,
it is publicly known that eA = A with probability q and eA = A with probability 1   q; and
both contingencies are contractible. Let Ae  qA + (1   q)A denote the mean. All agents are
protected by limited liability. Further assumptions are made below.
Assumption 1: Households cannot distinguish an entrepreneur from a layman (household),
but can recognize deep pockets. Deep pockets recognize entrepreneurs.
The rst part of the assumption is based on the fact that entrepreneurs have human capital
and deep pockets have physical capital, and human capital is much harder to observe than
physical capital. In this economy, a household, a layman, could have an idea of nonsense and
would be happy to play it with others funds. Households cannot distinguish this nonsense
from a sensible idea, and thus will not accept papers issued by anyone who claims himself an
entrepreneur. But they accept nancial contracts issued by one whom they recognize is a deep
pocket, since he plays with his own funds.
The assumption presents the sole friction of the model, because of which regulation plays
a role. By this assumption, entrepreneurs have no way to signal their human capital (namely
their type) to households, and have to be nanced by deep pockets. This is clearly extreme,
but simplies the analysis considerably. The assumption necessitates deep pockets to provide
intermediation service for households and become Financial Intermediaries (FIs; hereinafter FI
and deep pocket are used interchangeably).11
10Assuming deep pockets to be risk neutral is more for the convenience of exposition than for substantial
reason; what matters is that they are less risk averse than households.
11Financial intermediation is driven by a similar assumption of limited participation in He and Krishnamurthy
(2008). However, even under this kind of assumptions, there is actually an alternative way of organizing nancing.
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Assumption 2: A household cannot split its unit of capital between investing in storage and
in a FI.
This assumption simplies the decision problem of households and does not a¤ect the me-
chanics of the paper.
Assumption 3: A < Ae and K  (Ae   A)(Ae) 1  :
The former part ensures that ventures are risky enough, and the latter that the capital deep
pockets is scarce.
Assumption 4: N > A
1
1  :
It says that the overall funds of households are abundant enough; particularly, as will be
shown, not all these funds are poured into FIs.
There are two markets to be cleared, corresponding to the two sides of the balance sheet of
FIs. On the asset side, there is the credit market between FIs and entrepreneurs; let I be the
credit demand of each entrepreneur and let R and R be the return rate of credit when eA = A andeA = A respectively. On the liability side, there is the market for absorbing householdsfunds.
Since the return rates to households o¤ered by a FI depend on the amount it borrows, which
is under its decision, this market is cleared by certainty equivalent return rate, r; that is, the
households investing in FIs obtain U(r). Since the households can alternatively choose storage,
r  1; and if r = 1; they are indi¤erent between storage and investing in FIs. Let L denote
the leverage level of a FI, namely the amount borrowed from households. As the population of
deep pockets and entrepreneurs are both one, I; K and L also denote the according aggregate
amount.
In this paper, for example, deep pockets can sell their knowledge of sensible projects directly to households,
namely, they becomes rating agents (RAs). In the setting of this paper, the FI-way dominates the RA-way. The
latter is subject to collusion in which a deep pocket recommends a fake entrepreneur and shares with him the
funds absorbed. This problem is removed in the FI-way, where the deep pocket has to clear the liabilities to the
creditor-households before allowed to consume anything; he would thus undergo the loss before the households if
investing in fake entrepreneurs. For details see Wang (2009), which compares various ways of organizing nancing.
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Denition 1 fR; R; r; I; Lg is a competitive equilibrium if and only if
(i) Given fR;Rg; I = argmax q(AI  RI) + (1  q)max(AI  RI; 0).
(ii) Given fR;R; rg; each deep pocket chooses the optimal L:
(iii) If r > 1; L = N; and if L < N; r = 1:
(iv) I = K + L.
(v) If AI  RI  0; then AI  RI = 0.
Condition (i) says that given the return rates of credit, each entrepreneur chooses the optimal
demand of the credit; the term max(AI   RI; 0) reects the fact that he may default in the
bad state. Condition (ii) says that given the prices on the two sides of the balance sheet, each FI
chooses the optimal leverage. Condition (iii) describes how the liability side market is cleared:
if r > 1; all households strictly prefer investing in FIs to storage and thus the market is cleared
at L = N ; if only a part of households invest in FIs (L < N), households must be indi¤erent
between this investment and storage, that is, r = 1: Condition (iv) clears the credit market.
Lastly, condition (v) is the condition of rational expectation, which says that if default is going
to happen in the bad state, deep pockets foresee it today and calculate the return rate in the
state accordingly.
Lemma 1 r = 1 in any competitive equilibrium.
Proof. If otherwise, r > 1; then L = N < I. On the other hand, AI

I
 1 in equilibrium, as the
output of a venture must cover the investment costs in the good state; it follows that I  A
1
1  ;
which is strictly less than N by Assumption 4, contradictory to N < I:
By Assumption 3, A < Ae; which implies that the return of the credit is always risky, as
follows.
Lemma 2 R > 1 > R in any competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Otherwise, suppose R = 1 = R: Consider the credit demand by entrepreneurs, which
depends on whether default happens in the bad state or not. If not, then entrepreneurs choose I
to maximize q(AI I)+(1 q)AII; which implies I = (Ae) 11  : But then the bad state output
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AI < AeI
 = Ae(Ae)

1  = (Ae)
1
1  = I: It follows that R  AI
I
< 1; contradictory to
the supposition that R = 1: If entrepreneurs default in the bad state, they choose I to maximize
q(AI I); which implies I = (A) 11  > (Ae) 11  : ThenR is further lower than 1, contradictory
to the supposition that R = 1:
The next section solves the competitive equilibrium with the minimum di¤erence between
R and R: This equilibrium features the least risk and is thus the most e¢ cient one, and the
equilibrium allocation is comparable to the social best allocation. As the liability side market is
cleared at r = 1 by Lemma 1, we are concerned with only the credit market.
III. The Competitive Equilibrium
Let us start with the supply side of the credit market. The supply of credit equals K + L: L is
also the leverage level of each deep pocket. How he decides the level is examined by the following
model, which is the building block of the paper.
A. The Building Block: Risk and Leverage
The model is interesting in itself. So let us recap briey the setting for individual deep pockets. A
deep pocket, risk neutral, has K units of funds. He faces two kinds of investment opportunities,
one-to-one storage and ventures with the gross return rate, eR; being R or R with probability
q and 1   q respectively. eR is certainly decided by the credit market, but is taken as given by
each deep pocket. There are also a lot of households, with Bernoulli utility function U(); which
satises U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0. Each household has 1 unit of funds, which cannot be split between two
investments. Let Re  qR + (1  q)R. Furthermore, assume
Re > 1 and qU(R) + (1  q)U(R) < U(1) (1)
It will be proved that (1) holds true in the general equilibrium, but for this subsection, let us
simply take it as an assumption.
Note that as qU(R) + (1   q)U(R) < U(1); households will not invest in ventures, even if
they know what a genuinely sensible venture is, that is, even without Assumption 1.
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A deep pocket, being risk neutral, will invest all his funds in a venture. Without any leverage,
he earns the expected return of Re per unit of his capital. He can, however, boost the return
rate of his capital by borrowing from households. To draw their interest, he promises to them a
certainty equivalent return rate, r: We saw r = 1, given there are too many households.
Suppose that the deep pocket takes in L households funds. He will invest all the K + L
units of funds in a venture; he gains nothing putting a borrowed dollar into storage: it returns
one dollar, which is wholly repaid back to the lender. The security o¤ered to the households
are represented by the prole of the return rates, fh; hg, which satises the following individual
rationality constraint (IR),
qU(h) + (1  q)U(h) = U(1) (2)
Overall the investment of the deep pocket returns (K +L)R in the bad state and (K +L)R
in the good state; he pays out Lh and Lh respectively. Thus, his expected prot is (1  q)((K +
L)R Lh) + q((K +L)R Lh): His problem is then to choose fL; h; hg to maximize this prot
subject to (2) and Lh  (K +L)R; the limited liability constraint. This problem is simplied a
lot by considering how he benets from leverage.
With each unit of householdsfunds, the deep pocket obtains Re from the investment, repays
he = qh + (1  q)h; and gains the margin of Re   he: The margin is Re   1 > 0, so long as the
security is risk free, namely h = h = 1: This is possible if and only if L  (K+L)R; equivalently
L  R
1 RK; by the limited liability constraint. Therefore, the deep pocket never stops borrowing
if L < R
1 RK: When L  R1 RK; however, the security becomes risky, namely h  1  h: In
order to mostly reduce the risk to the households, he let them take all the earnings in the bad
state. The limited liability constraint is thus binding,
h =
(K + L)R
L
(3)
Therefore, the security to the households is debt, with the face value of h; and the deep pockets
funds form the capital (the equity) of the FI. He gains net prot only in the good state. His
problem becomes:
Problem 1 maxL;h;h = q((K + L)R  Lh) s.t. (2) and (3).
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It is equivalent to maximize L(R   h): The optimal leverage is decided by the trade-o¤
between the scale (L) and the prot margin (R h): the higher is L; the smaller is h by (3), then
the larger is h by (2), and hence the lower is R  h: At the margin of R  h and the scale of L;
the gain from borrowing dL more is (R  h)  dL: However, for the already borrowed L units of
funds, the prot margin decreases by dh; leading to the total loss of L  dh: In the optimization,
the two sides are equalized, (R   h)  dL = L  dh; equivalently, R   h   L dh
dL
= 0: Note that
dh
dL
= dh
dh
 dh
dL
; calculated from (2) and (3) respectively. Then we have the following rst order
condition.
R  h  (1  q)U
0(h)
qU 0(h)
KR
L
= 0 (4)
Then, the system of (2), (3), and (4) decides the optimal fL; h; hg, for the given fR;Rg: All the
three equations depend on K only through l  L
K
; the leverage rate. Therefore, the optimal l
is a function of R;R; independent of K: Let the function be l(R;R); which could equal 1 for
some fR;Rg:
The leverage of each deep pocket is then L = Kl(R;R):
We saw that the debt is risk free until l = R
1 R :
12 But the deep pocket will not stop borrowing
at this level, by the lemma below.
Lemma 3 l(R;R) > R
1 R and hence the debt of FIs is risky.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that d
dL
jL= R
1 RK
> 0; so that the deep pocket will keep borrowing at
l = R
1 R :
d
dL
= q(R   h  (1 q)U 0(h)
qU 0(h)
KR
L
): When L = R
1 RK; h = h = 1: Substitute these L; h;and
h into the equation, d
dL
jL= R
1 RK
= q(R  1  (1 q)
q
(1 R)) = Re   1 > 0:
The intuition for the lemma is simple. At l = R
1 R ; the borrowing is still risk free and the
overall margin is still Re 1 > 0; as the proof shows, and hence the deep pocket keeps borrowing.
  q(R Re) = (1 q)(Re R) measures the risk of the projects. l(R;R) can be transformed
into a function of  and Re: The following lemma says that the leverage increases with the return
rates of the projects and decreases with the risk.
12In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), borrowing is assumed to be risk free, and hence l  R1 R .
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Lemma 4 @l
@R
> 0 and @l
@R
> 0; @l
@Re
> 0 and @l
@
< 0.
Proof. See the appendices. Notice that @l
@Re
> 0 is simply implied by the former half of the
lemma.
The lemma can be intuitively understood through the trade-o¤ between the scale and the
prot margin. For example, if R increases, then given L; the prot margin R h increases, which
gives room to raise the scale. Similarly, given Re xed, suppose  increases. Then R increases,
and so does h; since h decreases when R decreases. The net e¤ect on the margin is negative 
hence l goes down since h increases by more than R due to two e¤ects. One is that because of
leverage, h decreases by more than R; indeed, dh = 1+l
l
dR by (3). The other is that because the
households are risk averse, h has to increase by more than to compensate the decrement in h
with he xed (that is dh >
1 q
q
( dh)). On the other hand, R increases by exactly to compensate
the decrement in R; as Re is xed.
In the next subsection, we move on to the demand side.
B. The Demand Side
As R R is reduced to the most in this equilibrium, entrepreneurs let the creditors, namely the
FIs, take all the yields in the bad state, IR = AI: Therefore,
R = AI 1 (5)
They then care only for the prot in the good state, and choose I to maximize AI  IR; which
implies
R = AI 1 (6)
Basically, (6) decides the demand I; and then (5) decides the bad state return rate R:
The next subsection ts the demand with the supply and pins down the competitive equilib-
rium.
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C. The Market Clearing
The market is cleared if the demand equals the supply, that is, I = K(1 + l(R;R)): Substitute
R and R with (6) and (5) respectively,
I = K(1 + l(AI 1; AI 1)) (7)
(7) has a unique solution, and hence the competitive equilibrium exists uniquely, by the
following reason. The left hand side (LHS) of (7) increases with I; while the right hand side
(RHS) decreases with it by Lemma 4. Moreover, if I ! A 11  and thus R = AI 1 ! 1; then
l ! 1 by Lemma 3; on the other hand, if I ! 1 and thus both rates go to 0, then l ! 0:
Therefore, the LHS and RHS intersect, and only once.
(1) is assumed in the building block model (subsection 3.1). Now it is time to prove it is an
outcome of the equilibrium.
Lemma 5 Re > 1; and qU(R) + (1  q)U(R) < U(1):
Proof. See the Appendices.
Re > 1 is driven by the scarcity of deep pocketscapital, namely the smallness ofK as is set in
Assumption 3. Nevertheless, for any K > 0; however small it is, leverage will expand the credit
supply to the level at which the interest rates satisfy qU(R)+(1  q)U(R) < U(1): The intuition
is that so long as the interest rates are higher, in the sense that qU(R) + (1  q)U(R)  U(1); it
will be protable for deep pockets to be leveraged more and to expand the credit supply, until
the interest rates are pulled down to satisfy the inequality.
Notice that in the partial equilibrium model of Subsection 3.1, where fR;Rg are given, the
total credit supply, K +L = K(1+ l(R;R)); is proportional to K: The model implies, therefore,
that the credit supply goes down linearly with FIs capital, especially it goes to 0 when the
capital goes to 0. This seems to have well justied the worry of banks issuing too little credit
when they su¤ers substantial loss. When fR;Rg is endogenized in general equilibrium, however,
Lemma 5 above says that the credit does not decrease so fast as linearly, and later Proposition
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1 will show that actually there is always too much credit. This illustrates the point that when
addressing the problem of credit shortage, those "partial equilibrium" models that take the credit
returns as given, such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and He and Krishnamurthy (2008), may
not provide robust conclusions.
Notice also that it was set in Assumption 1 that households do not directly invest in en-
trepreneurs because they fail to observe the entrepreneurial human capital ex ante. That
qU(R) + (1   q)U(R) < U(1) implies that even if they can recognize a genuine entrepreneur
ex post (for example, by observing him nanced by a deep pocket), they will not directly invest
in him because of the risk involved.
Substitute (5) and (6) into (3) and (4),
h =
A(K + L)a
L
(8)
A(K + L) 1   r   (1  q)U
0(h)
qU 0(r)
A(k + L) 1
L
K = 0 (9)
The system of these two equations plus (2), the IR to households, decides the equilibrium
fL; h; hg; which we denote by fLE; hE; hEg. And the equilibrium return rates are denoted by
R
E
and RE: The leverage rate is lE = L
E
K
and the total credit is IE = K(1+lE):   q(A Ae) =
(1   q)(Ae   A) measures the macroeconomic risk. We have the following comparative statics
results.
Lemma 6 When the capital of the FIs (K) increases, the leverage rate (lE) decreases, but the
total credit (IE) increases. Given K; the leverage rate and the total credit decrease with the
macroeconomic risk ().
Proof. It su¢ ces to prove @l
E
@K
< 0; @I
E
@K
> 0, and @l
E
@
< 0 (keep Ae xed). See the Appendices.
Notice that @l
E
@K
< 0 is an e¤ect of general equilibrium, as in the partial equilibrium of
Subsection 3.1, the leverage rate is independent of K. On the other hand, the result that the
leverage rate decreases with the risk holds true in both partial and general equilibrium.
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The next section considers the social best allocation, which is restored in the marekt by a
proper regulation.
IV. The Social Best Allocation and the Capital Adequacy
Regulation
We show rst that FIs are overleveraged and then that the social best allocation is implemented
by the competitive market if FIs are regulated not to be leveraged over the social best level.
A. The Social Best Allocation
Because of the di¤erence in risk preference between the agents, there is a continuum of Pareto
optimal allocations. To be comparable with the equilibrium allocation, we consider the allocation
that maximizes the total sum of the prots of deep pockets and entrepreneurs subject to giving
households the equilibrium utility, U(1): Therefore, the social planners problem is
Problem 2 MaxL;h;hq[A(K + L)
   Lh] + (1  q)[[A(K + L)   Lh]; s.t.
(a): qU(h) + (1  q)U(h) = U(1); and (b): A(K + L)   Lh  0:
Here, fh; hg is the consumption prole allocated to each of the L households that contribute
their capital to ventures. Constraint (a) ensures that they obtain U(1) and is the same as (2),
the IR for households to invest in FIs; constraint (b) is the resource constraint, equivalent to the
limited liability constraint.
As in the deep pockets problem, the social planner, whenever possible, wants fh; hg to be
risk free: h = h = 1; this is possible if and only if L  A(K + L): Given L; the marginal
product of a unit of householdscapital is M(L)  qA(K + L) 1 + (1   q)Aa(K + L) 1: If
the risk free consumption prole is available and M(L)  1; the social planner keeps drawing
householdscapital into ventures. Indeed, M(L)  1; when the consumption prole is risk free,
according to the following lemma.
Lemma 7 M(L)  1 for L  A(K + L):
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Proof. Parallel to the proof of Lemma 5. See the Appendices.
The lemma is driven by Assumption 3, which says that both K and A are small enough.
The social planner, therefore, takes in householdscapital beyond the level of the risk free
consumption prole being available. This implies, as in the deep pockets problem, that all the
outputs in the bad state are distributed to the households in Problem 2. That is, constraint (b)
of Problem 2 is binding, which gives rise to (8). Then, the social planners problem becomes:
Problem 3 maxL;h;hA(K + L)
   Lh; s.t. (2) and (8).
The rst order conditions of the problem are (2), (8), and
A(K + L) 1   h  (1  q)U
0(h)
qU 0(h)
A(K + L) 1
L
(K + (1  )L) = 0 (10)
The system of these three equations decides the social best fL; h; hg; which we denote by
fLB; hB; hBg. The system that decides fLE; hE; hEg is composed of (2), (8), and (9). The
di¤erence between (9) and (10) is that the term (1 )L is present not in the former, but in the
latter. This di¤erence leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 LB < LE; that is, in the competitive market FIs are over-leveraged.
Proof. See the Appendices.
To obtain an intuition for this result, let us check where the term (1   )L comes from.
Compare Problem 1 to Problem 3. The LHS of (9) is the derivative of the deep pockets objective,
(K + L)R  Lh; with respect to L; while the LHS of (10) is the corresponding derivative of the
planners objective, A(K + L)   Lh: As R = AI 1 in the equilibrium, the di¤erence is
only in the term L dh
dL
: It equals Ldh
dh
dh
dL
= L (1 q)U
0(h)
qU 0(h)
dh
dL
in both cases; however, h = (K+L)R
L
in the deep pockets problem, whereas h = A(K+L)
a
L
in the planners problem. In equilibrium
R = A(K +L) 1 so that the two h are equal for any given L: However, when choosing L; each
deep pocket takes R as given and ignores the e¤ect of his choice of L on it, whereas the planner
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takes this e¤ect into account, which gives rise to the term (1  )L in (10).13 Intuitively, there
is a negative externality: the leverage of one FI expands the credit supply, which marginally
lowers the return of the credit, and thus the bad state return rate which another FI o¤ers to
its creditors; consequently that FI has to o¤er to them a higher good state return rate, which
reduces the FIs prot margin. Because of this negative externality, FIs are overleveraged.
Remark: this ine¢ ciency is robust to the renegotiation between deep pockets and entre-
preneurs. Consider the easy case where an entrepreneur is nanced by only one deep pocket
who, on the other hand, only nances the entrepreneur. The deep pocket may suggest that the
entrepreneur invest less, only IB = K+LB; and obtain in the good state (1 )A(IE); exactly
what he would obtain if turning to the credit market. Suppose the entrepreneur accepts the
suggestion and signs the agreement, which the deep pocket shows to LB households, in order to
convince them that they will obtain hB(> hE) in the bad state and thus should accept the return
rate of h
B
(< h
E
) in the good state. The deep pocket would achieve the social best leverage if the
households were convinced that the agreement would be honored; in that case, the equilibrium
considered above is not robust. However, they will not be convinced, for two reasons. First, the
households do not know whether the entrepreneur who signs the agreement is a genuine entrepre-
neur and thus the agreement is a genuine agreement. Second, even if the agreement is genuine,
it will not be honored. After taking in the householdscapital, the deep pocket will invest all
K + LB = IB units of funds in the credit market instead of in the entrepreneur as is agreed,
thus the households going to obtain I
BRE
LB
< hE:14 the revenue in the good state is IBR
E
by the
former investment and A(IB)   (1  )A(IE) by the latter; IBRE > A(IB)   (1  )A(IE)
always.15
13Let "0" denote the derivative to L: Then (A(k+L)aL )0 = ( (K+L)RL )0 =  KL2 R + K+LL R0 =  RL2 (K + (1   )L);
since R0 =  (1  ) RK+L : Therefore, K+LL R0 contributes the term (1  )L:
14 I
BRE
LB
= (K+L
B)A(K+LE) 1
LB
< (K+L
B)A(K+LB) 1
LB
= hB :
15the inequality is equivalent to (1   )A(IE) > A(IB)   IBRE : As IB < IE ; it follows from the fact
that f(I)  AI   IRE < (1   )A(IE) for any I < IE : That is true, because f(IE) = (1   )A(IE); and
f 0(I) = R(I) RE > 0 for I < IE ; which is because R(I) = AI 1 decreases with I and RE = R(IE):
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This market failure stated by Proposition 1 exists only because the deep pockets become FIs
standing between households and entrepreneurs. It would not arise if entrepreneurs could issue
nancial contracts directly to both deep-pockets and households. In that case, they would issue
equity to former and the debt to the latter, according to the risk preference. The return rates
of the debt o¤ered by one entrepreneur would depend not upon the leverage of another project,
but only upon that of his own, which cuts o¤ the logical link leading to the externality. Indeed,
the social best allocation would be achieved, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 2 When entrepreneurs could issue nancial contracts directly to households, the
competitive equilibrium would implement the social best allocation, fLB; hB; hBg.
Proof. See the appendices.
We return to the model, where deep pockets become FIs which are overleveraged by Propo-
sition 1. We move on to consider the regulation under which the market equilibrium implements
the social best allocation.
B. The Capital Adequacy Regulation
The social best allocation can be restored by the capital adequacy regulation that prohibits the
share of a FIs equity in the book value from being less than K
K+LB
, that is, prohibits the leverage
rate of a FI from being more than L
B
K
; the social best level. The regulation leads to the following
results.
Proposition 3 Under the regulation that l  LB
K
; the competitive equilibrium implements fLB; hB; hBg;
and the prot of entrepreneurs decreases and the prot of deep pockets increases.
Proof. Since IE = K+LE is the unique solution of (7) and is larger thanK+LB by Proposition
1, K + LB < K(1 + l(R(IB); R(IB)). This inequality implies LB < Kl(R(IB); R(IB)): That is,
LB is less than the optimal leverage level of a FI when facing R(IB); R(IB). Each FI would
want to borrow more, which is, however, disapproved by the regulation. Therefore, all FIs are
leveraged to the regulation limit, L
B
K
; and fLB; hB; hBg is implemented. Compare the payo¤ for
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each group with the regulation to without. Households get the same, U(1): The entrepreneurs
get less: they are paid o¤only in the good state, with AI IR = (1 )AI; and the regulation
shrinks I from K + LE to K + LB. Thus, deep pockets get more, since the regulation increases
the sum total of the payo¤s of entrepreneurs and deep pockets.
The fact that the nancial sector as a whole gains from the regulation does not mean that
individual FIs are happy to abide by it. On the contrary, as the proof above shows, given the
high return rates of credit brought by this regulation, which shrinks the credit supply, individual
FIs want to be leveraged over the regulation limit. They would like to set up o¤-balance "Special
Investment Vehicles", if possible.
V. Conclusion
The paper presents a general equilibrium model on the leverage of nancial intermediaries (FIs),
which is driven by the di¤erence in risk preference. In the paper, the equity of FIs is held by risk
neutral agents (deep pockets), and the debt is held by risk averse agents (households). Equity
holders use their capital as the cushion to absorb the loss to debt holders in the bad state, so
the debt holders are willing to invest in the FIs; the debt holderscapital is used to boost the
return of the equity. With each unit of this capital, the equity holders gain the margin between
the expected return rate on the asset side and that repaid to the debt holders. The margin
goes down with the scale of the leverage: the more the borrowing, the less the average capital
used to cushion each borrowed unit, the greater the risk to the debt holders, hence the higher
the expected return they demand, and the lower the prot margin. The trade-o¤ between the
margin and the scale decides the optimal leverage rate of a FI, which decreases with the risk on
its asset side.
In the paper, the asset side of FIs is determined by the credit market between FIs and
entrepreneurs. With the asset side endogenized, the paper nds that in an unregulated market,
FIs are leveraged over the social best level, because of the following externality. The leverage
of one FI expands the credit supply, which marginally lowers the credit return rate in the bad
state, which in turn lowers the bad state return rate that other FIs o¤er to their lenders; as
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compensation, they have to o¤er a higher good state return rate, and obtain a lower prot
margin. This paper suggests, therefore, that the whole nancial sector should be subject to this
capital adequacy regulation. Moreover, the paper shows that the aggregate credit supply indeed
goes down with the aggregate capital of FIs, but in a much slower pace than linearly (which
is the prediction of the models that take the credit return rates as given). Indeed, however
small the aggregate capital is, the aggregate credit is always abundant, in the sense that the
resulting credit return rates are so low that households nd it uninteresting to directly invest in
entrepreneurs.
The model of the paper is static. It could be extended to a fully edged RBC style model,
which would be useful to investigate the dynamics of the leverage of FIs and whether debt
accumulation by the nancial sector necessarily leads to systematic risks.
Appendices
The Proof of Lemma 4:
To show comparative statics, we resort to the following principle: if some change leads margin
(R   h) to increase for any given l; then it will increase l; the leverage rate. For the optimal
leverage rate is decided by the trade-o¤ between the margin and the scale; thus the increment
in the former gives the room for increase in the latter.
Given l; xed R implies xed h and hence xed h: Thus, if R increase, then R h is increased.
On the other hand, if R increase, then so does h: By (2), h decreases. Thus, the margin increases
also. Therefore, in both cases, l is increased, by the principle above.
Consider the e¤ect of d > 0: dR = d
q
and dR =  d
1 q : Given l, dh =
1+l
l
dR = 1+l
l
 d
1 q : To
keep he = qh+ (1  q)h unchanged, dh = 1 qq ( dh): Because the households are risk averse, to
satisfy their IR, the required increment dh > 1 q
q
( dh) = 1+l
ql
d: Then change in the margin is
d(R  h) = d
q
  dh <  1
ql
d < 0: Thus dl < 0: Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 5:
To prove Re > 1; it su¢ ces to show that Re = 1) K > (Ae   A)(Ae) 1  ; which violates
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Assumption 3. With each unit of borrowed capital, the prot margin of a deep pocket is Re he:
If Re = 1, the margin is 0, as he  1; and is strictly negative when he > 1, which is the
case if the repayment fh; hg bears any risk by the IR, (2), since households are risk averse.
Therefore, if Re = 1; leverage happens only if fh; hg is risk free, that is, h = 1 = h: Then by the
limited liability constraint, L  (K + L)R, L  R
1 RK: In equilibrium, I = K + L; therefore,
I  1
1 RK , K  (1 R)I: By (5), I = (AR)
1
1  : Therefore,
(A1): K  (1 R)(A
R
)
1
1  :
On the other hand, by (5) and (6), R = A
A
R: So qR + (1  q)R = 1) qA+(1 q)A
A
R = 1)
R = A
qA+(1 q)A : By (A1), K  f(
A
qA+(1 q)A); where f(x) = (1 x)(
A
x
)
1
1  : Since f is decreasing
and A
Ae
> A
qA+(1 q)A ; K  f(
A
qA+(1 q)A) > f(
A
Ae
) = (Ae A)(Ae) 1  ; violating Assumption
3. This ends the proof of the former part.
To prove the latter part of the lemma, it su¢ ces to show that if qU(R)+(1 q)U(R)  U(1);
the optimal L = 1; which cannot be true in equilibrium. In order to show that, it su¢ ces to
prove L = 1 for the case where qU(R) + (1   q)U(R) = U(1); because by Lemma 4, higher iseR; the larger is L:
To prove that, it su¢ ces to show d
dL
> 0 for any nite L: 1
q
d
dL
= R   h   (1 q)U 0(h)
qU 0(h)
KR
L
: By
(2), qU(h)+ (1  q)U(h) = U(1) = qU(R)+ (1  q)U(R): It follows that q(U(R) U(h)) = (1 
q)(U(h) U(R)), qU 0()(R h) = (1 q)U 0()(h R); for some ;  such that R >  > h > h >
 > R: Then R h = (1 q)U 0()
qU 0() (h R) = (1 q)U
0()
qU 0()
KR
L
; where the last equation applies h = (K+L)R
L
by (3). Substitute this formula for R   h into the equation of d
dL
; 1
q
d
dL
= (1 q)KR
qL
(U
0()
U 0()   U
0(h)
U 0(h)):
Because h >  and U 0 is decreasing, U 0() > U 0(h); similarly U 0() < U 0(h) since  > h:
Therefore, U
0()
U 0() >
U 0(h)
U 0(h) : Hence
d
dL
> 0 for any L. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 6:
First, let us establish that @I
E
@K
> 0: Suppose otherwise @I
E
@K
 0: Then, @RE
@K
 0 and @RE
@K
 0:
By Lemma 4, lE = l(R
E
; RE) increases with K; which implies IE = K(1 + lE) strictly increases
with K; contradictory to the supposition that @I
E
@K
 0: Therefore, @IE
@K
> 0: Second, @I
E
@K
> 0
implies that both @R
E
@K
< 0 and @R
E
@K
< 0; which, by Lemma 4, implies @l
E
@K
< 0:
As to the e¤ects of ; let us establish @I
E
@
< 0; so that @l
E
@
< 0; as IE = K(1 + lE) and K is
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xed. Suppose otherwise @I
E
@
 0, @lE
@
 0: Then, @Re
@
< 0; since Re = ((q + 1  q)Ae   (1 
))(IE) 1: Meanwhile, ; the variance of eR, increases with : Both changes strictly decrease
lE by Lemma 4, contradictory to the supposition that @l
E
@
 0: Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 7:
The key condition for this lemma is K  (Ae   A)(Ae) 1  ; as is for the former part of
Lemma 5. Since M(L) decreases with L; it su¢ ces to prove that M(L)  1 for the L such
that L = A(K + L): To see the parallel to the proof of Lemma 3, here let R  A(K + L) 1:
Then M(L) = Ae
A
R; and K + L = (A
R
)
1
1  : By the latter, the condition L = A(K + L) ,
(A
R
)
1
1   K = A(A
R
)

1  ; which is equivalent to
(D1): K = f(R)  (1 R)(A
R
)
1
1  :
(D1) is parallel to (A1) of the proof of Lemma 3. By Assumption 3,K  (Ae A)(Ae) 1  =
f( A
Ae
): Then R = f 1(K)  A
Ae
; as f(R) is decreasing. It follows that M(L) = Ae
A
R  1.
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 1:
The only di¤erence is between (9) and (10). These two equations can be unied into
(F1): A(K + L) 1   h  (1 q)U 0(h)
qU 0(h)
A(K+L) 1
L
(K + L) = 0:
(F1) is (9) for  = 0 (the competitive equilibrium case) and is (10) for  = 1   (the social
best case). Let L() be the solution of (F1), where h and h are implicit functions of L decided
by (8) and (2), which are rewritten below.
(F2): h = A(K+L)
a
L
:
(F3): qU(h) + (1  q)U(h) = U(1):
Because L(0) = LE and L(1   ) = LB; to prove LB < LE, it su¢ ces to show that dL
d
< 0
for   1  :
Let F (L; ) be the LHS of (F1). Then, dL()
d
=   @F=@
@F=@L
: Simply @F
@
=  S(L)A(K+L) 1 < 0;
where S(L) = (1 q)U
0(h)
qU 0(h) > 0; an implicit functions of L: To prove
dL()
d
< 0; it su¢ ces to show
@F
@L
< 0: @F
@L
= (   1)A(K + L) 2   dh
dL
  dS
dL
A(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
  SdA(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
=dL: The
rst term is negative; as to the third term, dS
dL
> 0, since with L increasing, h decreases and
accordingly h increases, and hence S = (1 q)U
0(h)
qU 0(h) increases. To show
@F
@L
< 0; it thus su¢ ces to
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prove that   dh
dL
  SdA(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
=dL < 0: By (F3), dh
dh
=  S: Then dh
dL
= dh
dh
dh
dL
=  S dh
dL
:
Thus,   dh
dL
  SdA(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
=dL = S( dh
dL
  dA(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
=dL); which is negative if and
only if dh
dL
< dA(K+L)
 1(K+L)
L
=dL: Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that dh
dL
< @g
@L
(L; ) for   1 ;
where g(L; )  A(K+L) 1(K+L)
L
:
@g
@
= A(K +L) 1: Then @g
@L
< 0: So @gL
@
= @g
@L
< 0; that is @g
@L
(L; ) decreases with : Notice
that h = g(L; 1): Then, dh
dL
= @g
@L
(L; 1) < @g
@L
(L; ) for   1  . Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 2:
An entrepreneur issues equity to deep pockets and debt to households. Similarly, to reduce
the risk to households to the most, all the yields are distributed to debt holders in the bad
state. The equity is thus represented by ; the return rate in the good state, which will clear
the market for deep pocketsfunds. The market for householdsfunds is cleared by certainty
equivalent return rate, r: Let fh; hg be the prole of the return rates of the debt, Kd denote the
entrepreneurs demand for deep pocketsfunds, and L denote the demand for householdsfunds.
Since the debt holders obtain all the yields in the bad state,
(G1): h = A(Kd+L)
a
L
:
h is decided through the IR, that is,
(G2): qU(h) + (1  q)U(h) = U(r):
Given f; rg; the entrepreneur decides Kd and L; by solving the following problem:
maxKd;L;h;hA(Kd + L)
   Kd   hL; s.t. (G1) and (G2).
The rst order conditions include G(1) and (G2) and the following.
(G3): A(Kd + L) 1   h  (1 q)U 0(h)qU 0(h)
A(Kd+L)
 1
L
(Kd + (1  )L) = 0
In the equilibrium, Kd = K; and r = 1 since N is large. The equilibrium fL; h; hg is to be
found by substituting Kd = K and r = 1 into equations (G1-3). The three equations are exactly
the same as (8) and (2) and (10) respectively. Therefore, the same prole of fLB; hB; hBg is
implemented in the equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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